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INVENTING AROUND COPYRIGHT
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I. INTRODUCTION
Patent law has long harbored the concept of “inventing around,” under
which competitors to a patent holder may be expected, and even
encouraged, to design their technologies so as to skirt the boundaries
defined by patent claims. It has become increasingly clear that, for better or
for worse, copyright also fosters inventing around. In each area, there is a
pattern of follow-on innovators designing new technology so as to avoid the
infringement liability that might accrue under the existing intellectual
property rights. However, inventing around a patent involves skirting the
definition of the protected invention, whereas inventing around a copyright
involves skirting terminology in the copyright statute. Unlike patent,
copyright is not based on written claims, and so copyright inventing around
does not involve navigating the boundaries of a particular intellectual
property holder’s right. Rather, because copyright links exclusive rights to
technological actions such as reproduction, distribution, or transmission, the
language of the copyright statute, and judicial readings of the statute, create
boundaries around which potential infringers may technologically navigate.
In this Essay, I discuss the phenomenon of inventing around in
copyright and how it might be informed by the better-understood
phenomenon of inventing around in patent law. I first describe prominent
examples of copyright inventing around observed in cases such as A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster and American Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo. I
then turn to an examination of the literature on inventing around in patent,
highlighting several insights that may be useful in understanding what
occurred in cases such as Napster and Aereo. Finally, I explore how the
motivations behind patent and copyright inventing around doctrines differ
in significant ways that might cause copyright inventing around to depart
from the analysis found in the patent literature. Recognizing the somewhat
hidden hand of copyright in fostering or shaping certain technological
progress, I argue that the merits and implications of copyright inventing
around deserve closer attention from the courts and Congress.
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II. COPYRIGHT AND TECHNICAL DESIGN
Copyright law by its nature encourages technological design choices
that take advantage of definitional loopholes in the rights granted under the
copyright statute. Several examples of this effect can readily be identified in
the recent history surrounding U.S. copyright law. For example, thirteen
years ago the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held the
purveyors of the Napster peer-to-peer file sharing system to be
contributorily and vicariously liable for copyright infringement.1 This
holding was based largely on the particular architecture of the Napster
system.2 Peer-to-peer systems are denominated as such because the
individual computing devices participating in the system communicate
directly with one another, rather than communicating through a central hub.
However, the Napster system maintained a centralized database listing files
resident on the system, which users could access to determine which files
they wished to share or acquire. Because of the presence of this centralized
feature, the court concluded that Napster had the ability to monitor both
who was using its system and what was accessible by means of the system. 3
Such knowledge is a key component of secondary copyright liability.4 Thus,
the architecture of the Napster technology led inevitably to the finding of
infringement.
Not surprisingly, the centralized features of the Napster system, on
which secondary liability was premised, were absent from the next
generation of peer-to-peer file sharing software.5 Subsequent systems such
as Grokster and KaZaa avoided any centralized monitoring or control point,
adopting more fully distributed architectures that dispersed indexing as well
as content and exchange among multiple network nodes.6 This allowed the
purveyors of the software to assert quite truthfully that they had no means
of knowing who or what was on their system at any given time, and having
no ability to monitor or control the use of the system, could not be
secondarily liable for infringing activity. Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court acknowledged the success of this strategy by inventing and imposing
on Grokster a new form of secondary liability, inducement, which required
no such knowledge or control, and so required no central feature to trigger
liability.7
1
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001)
[http://perma.cc/EZH6-L544].
2
See id. at 1020, 1024.
3
Id. at 1021–24.
4
Id. at 1020.
5
REBECCA GIBLIN, CODE WARS: 10 YEARS OF P2P SOFTWARE LITIGATION 29-33 (2011).
6
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on
the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 519 (2003) [http://perma.cc/TVG6-LV9P]; id. at 73–
74.
7
MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005) [http://perma.cc/9QFV-NZNH].
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Grokster and KaZaa intentionally attempted to design around the
contours of technological liability as mapped out by the Ninth Circuit in the
Napster decision. But this type of inventing around copyright is by no
means unusual. It appears in the more recent ABC v. Aereo, Inc. controversy
recently decided by the Supreme Court.8 The Aereo storage and
transmission technology at issue in the case provided subscribers with
streaming Internet retransmission of over-the-air broadcast television
programming. The system was explicitly designed to conform to definitions
of permissible activity articulated in previous copyright cases.9 Specifically,
the copyright statute grants copyright holders an exclusive right of public
performance for their works. Previous court decisions had held that an
individually stored recording of a broadcast television show, accessed by a
particular user at that user’s discretion, did not constitute a public
performance of the show, but was rather a private performance outside the
ambit of the copyright holder’s exclusive right.10
Aereo built its service around technology meeting this definition of
noninfringing private transmission.11 The Aereo system is comprised of
thousands of tiny antennae that receive broadcast programming. 12 Each
antenna is assigned to an individual subscriber upon the subscriber
requesting to watch a certain show; Aereo records and stores the show on a
folder on Aereo’s servers—accessible only by that subscriber—and then
streams the recorded show over the Internet to the subscriber.13 Thus, every
step of the Aereo transmission was designed to permit only private
performances, not public performances as defined by the courts, and so to
skirt the rights of the copyright holder as articulated in previous copyright
decisions.
A majority of the Second Circuit reviewing panel agreed that Aereo’s
set-up provided a private transmission, effectively skirting the statutory
exclusive right for public performances.14 In dissent, Judge Chin asserted
with some apparent outrage that the Aereo design was an “over-engineered”
“Rube Goldberg” contraption, designed solely to avoid the letter of the
8

ABC v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) [http://perma.cc/FFM8-MU3W].
See Brian Fung, Aereo: Yes We’re a Rube Goldberg Device. And We’re Proud of It., WASH. POST
(March 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/03/27/aereo-yes-were-arube-goldberg-device-and-were-proud-of-it [http://perma.cc/5KS2-W8YG].
10
Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139 (2d Cir. 2008)
[http://perma.cc/9RFQ-2CHB].
11
Cecilia Kang & Robert Barnes, Supreme Court to Decide on Aereo, Obscure Start-up that Could
Reshape TV Industry, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
technology/2014/04/21/50bbd1e8-c59d-11e3-9f37-7ce307c56815_story.html [http://perma.cc/T3W74EAW].
12
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503.
13
Id.
14
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, 712 F.3d 676, 696 (2d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom., ABC v. Aereo, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) [http://perma.cc/D4HV-AS6B].
9
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copyright statute.15 Judge Chin observed there was no particular reason to
design the system with tiny individual receiving antennae except as a dodge
around the public performance right; absent the previous definition of
public performances, it might well have been more efficient to design a
service for streaming and recording broadcast with a single receiving
antenna.16 The Supreme Court largely agreed, rejecting Aereo’s
“technological differences” as immaterial to the question of public
performance.17
III. INVENTING AROUND TEXTS
From the standpoint of intellectual property policy, the type of
technical end-run seen in Aereo is hauntingly familiar. A different branch of
intellectual property law, patent law, has long recognized the policy
justification of inventing around, which is sometimes touted as one of the
benefits of the patent system. Unlike copyright, the boundaries of the patent
holder’s rights are defined by textual claims in the patent document;
infringement occurs in cases of unauthorized making, using, selling,
offering for sale, or importing technology that falls within the claims. 18
Competitors to the patent holder may therefore invest in developing
substitutes that fall outside the claims, which is to say in inventing around
the obstacle of the patent right. Patents are intended to encourage
innovation, and are usually assumed to do so via the reward of exclusive
rights in a meritorious invention, but the inventing around rationale
suggests that patents may also somewhat perversely spur innovation as
others seek permissible alternatives to the legally encumbered technology.
Thus, in the patent context, contrary to Judge Chin’s views in
copyright, a technological design that intentionally skirts the intellectual
property holder’s rights may be viewed as a proper or desirable response to
the presence of exclusivity. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in particular has touted inventing around as a spur to
innovation, suggesting that rights which may be viewed as impediments to
competitors actually force competitors to become more innovative in the
course of avoiding infringement.19 Patent law’s doctrine of equivalents
prevents trivial or obvious inventing around patent claims—under this
doctrine, known substitutes or insubstantial variations on the claimed

15

Id. at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting).
Id.
17
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508.
18
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) [http://perma.cc/8M4L-WV93].
19
See, e.g., State Indus. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
[http://perma.cc/GH2H-JS47]. See generally Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d
1437 (Fed. Cir. 1984) [http://perma.cc/9LM3-9E8W].
16
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invention still fall within the ambit of the patent holder’s rights.20 Thus, in
order to avoid infringement, inventing around patent claims will tend to
require a substantial degree of innovation and the investment that goes
along with this requirement.21
Inventing around in patent law is largely a result of textual formalism.
Because the scope of patent rights is defined by written claims, determining
the scope of the claims requires interpretation.22 The settled first step in
patent claim construction is deciding the literal meaning of the claims—that
is, assigning discrete denotations to words or phrases within the text.23 This
defines a conceptual boundary that determines not only what technology is
covered by the patent, but also what technology is not covered by the
patent. Technologies that lack each of the elements of the claims, or arrange
components in some substantially different way, fall outside the formal
denotation of the claims and so are not considered infringing. Competitors
to the patent holder are considered perfectly justified in developing or
adopting alternatives that lie outside the interpretive boundaries of the
claims.
By contrast, in copyright, it is either the statute itself or a particular
doctrine, such as contributory infringement, rather than textual claims that
lead to inventing around. Of course, in some cases, the patent statute may
lend itself to inventing around. For example, a line of cases culminating in
the current Supreme Court review of Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight
Networks, Inc.24 holds that for a process patent to be directly infringed under
35 U.S.C. § 271(a), a single entity must perform or direct all the steps of the
claimed process.25 This might create an incentive for a potential infringer to
innovate in such a way as to decouple steps in the process, so that different
actors may perform different steps.26 However, for the most part, this
infringement loophole is likely to prompt business or logistical innovation
rather than technical innovation. The patent statute generally sets broad
criteria for patentability, which are then realized in specific patent claims,
pushing the practice of inventing around to the level of the patent text,
rather than to the level of the patent statute’s text.
20

London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
[http://perma.cc/M7H5-Q2BZ].
21
Paul N. Katz, The Doctrine of Equivalents and Its Impact on “Designing Around”, 4 FED. CIR.
B.J. 315, 322–23 (1994).
22
See Dan L. Burk, Dynamic Claim Interpretation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON
LAW 107, 107–08 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (discussing formalism in claims interpretation).
23
See Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 401 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (explaining claims
interpretation) [http://perma.cc/3XZD-2VAP].
24
692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012), rev’d 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014) [http://perma.cc/9VSG-3JSU].
25
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117–18 (2014)
[http://perma.cc/QGX-3GQT].
26
Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 260 (2005)
[http://perma.cc/MQF2-KW34].
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Unlike the patent statute, the copyright statute entails several features
that foster statutory inventing around. First, copyright has evolved to place
exclusive rights at the level of activities such as reproduction and
distribution of copies, or transmission of performances, which are largely
technological activities.27 Whereas patent law is meant to promote
technological discovery and progress, copyright was classically intended as
a response to technological discoveries or progress that made it easier for
third parties to copy and benefit from the creative works of others. As new
technology, such as the printing press, lowered the cost and speed of
copying, prices fell, availability of content rose, and natural copy control by
means of physical impediments deteriorated.28 Legal exclusivity replaced
some of the control that was lost due to more effective copying technology.
As increasingly effective copying technology was developed and
disseminated—such as offset lithography, xerography, and digitization—
legal exclusivity was called upon to fill a greater and greater gap between
the initial cost of creation and the cost of subsequent dissemination.29
Second, the copyright statute has been the site of repeated, ongoing,
and frequent amendment to address technologically specific activities. This
has largely been the result of legislative lobbying by established industries
that are invested in a particular technology or associated business model.30
Such amendments divide rights and responsibilities among stakeholders,
extend the exclusive rights granted by the statute, and sometimes create
exceptions to or exemptions from existing exclusive rights. The
amendments are typically couched in terms of the most contemporary
technological threat to the hegemony of copyright holders. Radio, broadcast
television, xerography, cable, digital transmission, and other
communication technologies have all left their mark on the statute as
Congress has responded to the demands of copyright holders, resulting in
the cumulative, technologically defined amendment of the statute over
time.31
IV. LEGAL EVASION AND TECHNICAL AVOISION
Such amendments provide fertile ground for inventing around,
although they are themselves the product of a separate phenomenon.
Copyright historians, such as Jessica Litman, have noted that
27

See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (listing the exclusive rights in copyright) [http://perma.cc/7PUE-

2P9J].
28
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 31
(rev. ed. 2003).
29
See id. at 21.
30
JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22–24 (2001).
31
See generally Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L.
REV. 275 (1989) (detailing successive legislative changes to the 1909 and 1976 copyright acts in
response to communication technologies) [http://perma.cc/W46W-NDNZ].
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communication technologies often initially thrive outside of the formal
boundaries of copyright.32 Such technologies begin and develop as media
not contemplated or controlled by the copyright statute, but are eventually
encompassed by amendments to the statute, producing an ever-increasing
statutory ambit of exclusivity. For example, the copyright status of
photography was initially uncertain, as it was unclear that the images
captured on photographic plates were works of authorship rather than facts
about the state of the world.33 Later on, motion pictures were registered with
the Copyright Office as collections of still photographs until Congress
added movies to the statute in 1912.34 Sound recordings similarly began as a
medium outside of copyright—the Supreme Court explicitly held that early
sound recordings were mechanical devices and not copies for purposes of
the statute—until Congress subsequently added them to the statute as a new
class of fixed works dubbed “phonorecords.”35
Such historical examples are largely concerned with technologies that
serendipitously grew beyond copyright’s boundaries. Their history might be
(and sometimes has been) taken as evidence that new technologies do better
outside of copyright—that only the technological seeds scattered outside of
copyright’s shadow receive enough sun and nourishment to flourish.36 But
here we are concerned with a related, though distinctly different
phenomenon, in which innovators deliberately take the measure of
copyright’s zone of exclusivity and then purposely design new technologies
that skirt that zone.
It might also be observed that versions of the inventing around effect
are not limited to intellectual property rights, but might be seen generally in
some form where human motivations and governmental regulation
intersect. No doubt securities regulation leads to innovative derivative
structuring intended to skirt the regulation, building codes lead to
innovative architectural and construction practices intended to skirt the
regulation, tax regulation leads to development of innovative tax shelters,
and so on. However, these are primarily unintended consequences and often
constitute unwanted or even malicious exploitation of gaps in the law. The
loopholes are often closed and the practice stamped out on the next round of
regulation.
Tim Wu has previously explored this aspect of technological design
based on legal loopholes.37 Wu argues that the response to legal constraints
32

See LITMAN, supra note 30, at 106–07.
See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (holding photographs to be
copyrightable works of authorship) [http://perma.cc/B9EZ-4GS4].
34
LITMAN, supra note 30, at 40–41.
35
Id. at 39; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “phonorecords”) [http://perma.cc/3ENWQ95J].
36
See LITMAN, supra note 30, at 106–07.
37
See generally Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679 (2003).
33
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will take the form of least cost avoidance: if compliance with law is the
least costly alternative, then compliance can be expected to occur.38 But
depending on relative cost, reactions to law may take other forms, such as
litigating or lobbying to change law, or re-structuring of business plans to
exploit legal loopholes.39 This latter effect is a common occurrence in
taxation or regulatory compliance, which Leo Katz dubbed “avoision,” a
portmanteau of “avoidance” and “evasion.”40 Taking a page from Larry
Lessig’s analysis of law and technology,41 Wu observes that if formal law
and technological constraints are at some level interchangeable, then
avoision may occur by re-structuring technology rather than re-structuring
behavior if such restructuring is less costly than compliance.42
But this picture, while useful, may be incomplete. Technological
avoidance may not necessarily be legal evasion, at least not in the sense
identified by Wu. In the Federal Circuit’s view of patent inventing around,
such activity does not constitute avoision, at least not as identified by
Professor Wu. To be certain, competitors to a patent holder who invent
around are avoiding the alternative of infringement, and they will
presumably do so only if inventing around is cheaper than the alternatives
of being penalized for infringing or of licensing. But avoiding the
boundaries of patent claims is not the same as avoiding the intent of the
patent law. To the contrary, inventing around patent claims is instead
considered a legitimate and desired response to the law; inventing around
is, if not the intended response to patent exclusivity, at least an intended
response to patent exclusivity.
V. RACING AND INVENTING AROUND
However established inventing around may be in patent law, in both of
the copyright examples I have mentioned—Grokster and the more recent
Aereo decision—the Supreme Court went out of its way to negate the
strategy of designing around. The question then may be how desirable
inventing around is as a policy matter and whether that policy applies only
to patents. The positive view of patent inventing around casts patent claims
as a kind of innovation obstacle course, intended to build fitness and
character in the competitors who are forced to navigate its hurdles. But this
position on inventing around is itself controversial. Many commentators
have been less enthusiastic about the concept, observing that inventing
around patent rights may well lead to inefficient and duplicative invention

38

Id. at 688–89.
Id. at 692–93.
40
LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE
LAW 17–30 (1996).
41
See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
42
Wu, supra note 37, at 708.
39
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by prompting development of unneeded or second best alternatives to
patented technologies.43
As Michael Abramowicz observed, inventing around is closely related
to patent racing and the question of rent dissipation.44 Rent dissipation
occurs when parties competing for the reward of the patent exhaust all or
part of the value of the patent in expenditures to obtain it. Inventing around
may be regarded as a sort of patent race in which one of the parties has
already won: rather than two innovators seeking to be the first to claim a
patent, in inventing around the late-coming competitor is left to develop a
technological alternative to the patent that has been granted. Mark Lemley
has recently argued that racing avoids the potential monopoly stagnation of
placing a broad swath of innovation into the hands of a single patent
owner.45 Thus, racing or inventing around provides alternatives to the
patented technology, potentially fostering competition, which is in and of
itself valuable. But the orthodox view of such races has been that both the
private and social value of the patent might be overshadowed by
expenditures to capture legal exclusivity.46
In this regard it is important to note that not only patent law—and
perhaps copyright law—but also the separate intellectual property area of
trade secrecy encourages a type of inventing around. The law of trade
secrecy, which penalizes misappropriation of confidential business
information, allows certain permissible activities that are considered proper
means to obtain the secret: either reverse engineering or independent
recreation of proprietary information is allowed.47 These legitimate methods
for capturing trade secrets serve to channel competitive activity away from
wasteful investments in industrial espionage or employee enticement and
instead prompt investment in productive activity that builds the technical
knowledge of the competitor.48 The permissible modes of obtaining
otherwise confidential information also place a natural cap on the cost of
licensing a trade secret. Trade secret licenses are always bargains for

43

F. M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 379–99 (3d ed. 1990); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal,
97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1869 (1984) [http://perma.cc/HU8C-VGGG]; Donald F. Turner, The Patent
System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 455 (1969).
44
Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 185 (2003)
[http://perma.cc/3Z4V-NZQB].
45
Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 754 (2012)
[http://perma.cc/WFG5-3ENJ]; see also Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District:
Observations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359 passim (1992) (cautioning that
preventing rent dissipation could curb beneficial competition) [http://perma.cc/R45B-26M2].
46
See Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305,
318 (1992).
47
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995) [http://perma.cc/XJ6F-44HK].
48
David D. Friedman, William M. Landes, & Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Trade Secret
Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 69 (1991).
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disclosure, and since reverse engineering or independent creation are
available as alternatives to disclosure, the cost of disclosure will rationally
be set at something a bit less than the cost of the alternatives.49
This view of trade secrecy suggests a similar construction of patent
inventing around. Much as in trade secrecy, patent inventing around is
unlikely to occur unless the patent holder and the competitor have very
different estimations of the cost of developing an alternative technology. 50 If
the valuations of inventing around costs are similar, the parties are likely to
be able to negotiate a royalty for use of the patented technology that will be
lower than the cost of inventing around: the competitor will not wish to
incur the inventing around cost if the royalty is cheaper, and the patent
holder will set the royalty low enough to avoid inducing the competitor to
invent around. Thus, when it occurs, inventing around in some sense
represents a bargaining breakdown.51
Consequently, the positive view of inventing around requires a tricky
allocation of economic surplus, as Suzanne Scotchmer famously observed,
between the patent holder and the competitor.52 Sufficient surplus from the
social value of the follow-on innovation must be allocated to the initial
innovator who obtains the patent; otherwise the patent holder may not be
properly motivated to invest in the patented item. At the same time, enough
surplus must be allocated to the follow-on competitor to ensure the
necessary investment in inventing around, which private licensing may not
accomplish. This suggests that incentives for patent inventing around may
be deficient; just as inventing around may be socially wasteful if the private
value to the competitor exceeds the social benefit of having a new
alternative technology, so failure to invent around may be socially wasteful
where the private value of the license to the patent owner exceeds the social
benefit of having the new technology.
VI. SECONDARY RACING
In copyright, unlike patent, there has been little analysis of the
tendency to foster alternative technological development. Professor
Abramowicz has analyzed copyright’s adaptive right in terms of rent
dissipation, much as he has examined inventing around in the patent
context.53 But the context of that analysis concerns not inventing around
49
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 279
(1977) [http://perma.cc/K5T6-T2ZP].
50
Martin J. Adelman, The Supreme Court, Market Structure, and Innovation: Chakrabarty, Rohm
and Haas, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 457, 464 (1982).
51
Id.
52
Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent
Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 34 (1991) [http://perma.cc/4SX6-VCNR].
53
See generally Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related
Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317 (2005) [http://perma.cc/49RG-E4EC].
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copyright doctrine, but what one might call “creating around” the protected
work itself: an attempt to develop a substitute for the copyrighted work.54
Copyright law’s doctrines of substantial similarity and derivative works
police such creations. As in the case of patent law’s doctrine of equivalents,
copyright mimicry that skirts too close to the rights in the protected work
will be penalized as an unauthorized adaptation or as substantially
reproducing the work, unless excused by one of the many statutory
privileges and exemptions that define the boundaries of the exclusive rights
in the work.55
Such creating around the work is somewhat analogous to patent
inventing around in that it attempts to develop a substitute for the particular
subject of exclusivity; however, as described above, it differs from patent
inventing around in that it does not involve skirting the formal
interpretation of a legal text.56 Most significantly, it is not the situs for
technological avoision of the kind we saw in the cases of Grokster and
Aereo. The Grokster and Aereo systems are not alternatives or substitutes
for copyrighted works; they are alternatives or substitutes for, respectively,
compact discs and cable transmission—that is, for preexisting methods of
delivering copyrighted works. The goal of a Grokster or Aereo designer is
not to circumvent a particular copyright, but to avoid liability for provision
of a class of copyrighted content. Typically, the copyright holder involved
in creating around will be fostering or developing content which may be
carried by means of such new technological conduits.
Thus, in the case of copyright, the incentives entailed in inventing
around are asymmetric: a given copyright holder is seldom in a race to
develop the new delivery technology at issue, or for that matter any other
technology. The development of peer-to-peer systems or Internet streaming
services does not entail races between different copyright holders to obtain
exclusive rights. Copyright inventing around, as described above, takes
advantage of the technology specificity of the copyright statute: innovators
design new technologies to avoid infringing the statutory rights tied to older
technologies. The copyright holder, on the other hand, will tend to be
invested in the existing technology that falls within the rights defined by the
statute or may possibly stand to benefit from extension of his rights to new
technologies similarly falling within the statutory ambit. In fact, the
copyright holder often has little incentive to develop or encourage
development of technologies outside those limits.
54

Indeed, Joseph Fishman has begun examining this type of activity under exactly this rubric. See
Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015)
[http://perma.cc/9URW-CVPK].
55
See generally Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative
Work Right, 101 GEO. L.J. 1505 (2013) [http://perma.cc/HD6B-8ZL4].
56
See Burk, supra note 22, at 109–10 (noting that copyrighted works are not defined by claims, as
patented inventions are).
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This results in what might be termed secondary racing: unlike the
paradigm in patent racing, the race in copyright is not a race for the
exclusive intellectual property right. Rather, innovators are racing against
either the established copying and distribution technologies or against the
technologies that might be preferred, endorsed, and licensed by copyright
holders. What this shares with patent racing is the potential for copyright
inventing around to be socially wasteful by channeling inventive effort
toward new methods of reproduction or distribution when adequate
methods are already available. This was in essence Judge Chin’s complaint
in Aereo.57 But this is not the consequence of an individual grant of
exclusive rights over copyrighted content. It is rather an ancillary effect of
exclusivity that a content developer has been granted over technological
conduits, either directly by virtue of statutory rights defined in terms of
technology, or indirectly by virtue of secondary liability doctrines.
Consequently, to the extent that inventing around in copyright
constitutes a bargaining breakdown, it is not the type of breakdown
identified above in the patent context. Copyright holders and innovators do
not have different valuations of the cost of licensing the existing intellectual
property as against the cost of developing alternative intellectual property,
as might be the case in patent inventing around. The question for the
competitor in copyright inventing around is not whether to invest in a
substitute movie or musical composition. Any disparity in valuation is
rather more a comparison of apples to oranges; that is, comparing the cost
of licensing the intellectual property versus developing an alternative
technological delivery system.
This asymmetry between the alternatives becomes starker on closer
examination. Because the alternative to inventing around in copyright is not
the development of an alternative creative work, the licensing possibility
involves the collective action problem of licensing the rights against
secondary liability held by all copyright owners whose works might be
infringed by the delivery under the current technology. As mentioned
above, any given copyright holder has little incentive to develop or
encourage development of technologies outside those limits, making
holdouts likely. This combination of asymmetric incentives is therefore
likely to make the redesign or inventing around option highly attractive to
the secondary racer.
The question then is whether this incentive is socially perverse. We
have said that copyright inventing around may be socially wasteful for
channeling inventive effort toward new methods of reproduction or
distribution when adequate methods are already available. The social
desirability of such inventing around depends upon whether Judge Chin’s
assertions are correct—whether, for example, designing a technological
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See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
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alternative to public performance, using scores of dime-sized antennae, is
an inefficient design intended only to circumvent some legal language or
whether it may instead constitute a useful innovation. In some cases, the
latter may prove true; for example, the peer-to-peer architectures developed
in the wake of the Napster ruling may be useful for some applications and
society is better off possessing the technology. At the time of this writing,
Netflix appears to be considering such peer-to-peer systems as a better way
to deliver authorized video content.58 Such systems would not have been
developed by copyright holders, and if they are socially valuable it is
unclear why their development should not be promoted via inventing
around.
VII.
CONCLUSION
In general, we do not think of copyright as a regime intended to foster
technological innovation.59 However, despite copyright’s ostensible
orientation toward promoting creative works by securing exclusive rights to
authors, copyright appears to also have a somewhat hidden hand in
fostering or shaping certain technological progress. By siting the exclusive
rights of copyright in technical actions, copyright law routinely promotes
inventing around, paralleling the more familiar inventing around doctrine in
patent law. But copyright inventing around is concerned with global
solutions for actions like reproduction or distribution, directed to classes of
creative works, rather than to particular creative works.
This fosters an asymmetry in the incentives of copyright holders and
technical innovators, which may frame a more compelling policy argument
for inventing around in copyright than is found in patent inventing around.
Indeed, in its recent Aereo decision, the Supreme Court, while rejecting the
particular design strategy adopted by the Aereo system, essentially invited
or suggested other system designs that it hinted might pass legal muster.60 If
copyright is either unwittingly or explicitly shaping such technological
endeavors, this effect requires closer consideration and more nuanced
recognition, either as a policy goal or as a policy by-product, than Congress
or the courts have granted it to date.
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Jon Brodkin, Netflix Researching “Large-Scale Peer-to-Peer Technology” for Streaming, ARS
TECHNICA (Apr. 25, 2014, 3:45 PM), http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/04/netflixresearching-large-scale-peer-to-peer-technology-for-streaming/ [http://perma.cc/4XLV-MVGE].
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With of course the possible exception, the exception which proves the rule, of computer software,
which remains problematic within the copyright regime precisely because it is technical rather than
artistic subject matter. See Dan L. Burk, Method and Madness in Copyright Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV.
587, 613–14 [http://perma.cc/H54V-P6ZK].
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See ABC v. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2510–11 (2014).
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